Financing Higher Education: Privatization, Resistance and Renewal by Turkel, Gerald
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy
Volume 0 NCSCBHEP Proceedings 2006 Article 3
April 2006
Financing Higher Education: Privatization,
Resistance and Renewal
Gerald Turkel
University of Delaware, gmturkel@udel.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba
This Proceedings Material is brought to you for free and open access by The Keep. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Collective Bargaining
in the Academy by an authorized editor of The Keep. For more information, please contact tabruns@eiu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Turkel, Gerald (2006) "Financing Higher Education: Privatization, Resistance and Renewal," Journal of Collective Bargaining in the
Academy: Vol. 0 , Article 3.
Available at: http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss1/3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Financing Higher Education: 
Privatization, Resistance and Renewal 
 
 
Gerald Turkel 
Chair of Committee on Government Relations 
American Association of University Professors 
 
Professor of Sociology and Legal Studies 
Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice 
University of Delaware 
Newark, DE 19716 
gmturkel@udel.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paper prepared for presentation at Annual Meeting, National Center for the Study of 
Collective Bargaining in Higher Education and the Professions 
New York City 
April 3, 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
Turkel: Financing Higher Education: Privatization, Resistance and Renewal
Published by The Keep, 2006
 2 
Financing Higher Education: Privatization, Resistance, and Renewal 
 
 
Introduction 
 The fiscal crisis of higher education currently is being resolved largely through a 
financing policy of privatization, a pattern that increasingly shifts responsibility to 
individual students and their families.  The politics of privatization makes it ever more 
difficult for lower-income students to attend college and has become a major financial 
burden for middle-income people.  Beyond the direct financial consequences, 
privatization has increasingly subordinated the research and educational missions of 
higher education to the countervailing imperatives of economic growth and 
competitiveness.  Privatization has enhanced the entrepreneurial and corporate features of 
universities and colleges, increasingly shifting the values of higher education away from 
notions of common property and the common good to individual self-interest and 
careerism.  The autonomy of higher education institutions has been weakened, both the 
economic status and professional independence of the faculty have been undermined, and 
students are increasingly defined as consumers. 
 In order to confront this epochal change and develop alternatives to it, we must 
analyze the fiscal changes that have taken place and more fully articulate their 
consequences.  In addition, we must analyze the political terrain and its possibilities, 
differentiating between strategies of resistance and strategies of renewal. On the one 
hand, strategies of resistance aim at maintaining and enhancing funding in the milieu of 
legal and institutional frameworks that have been established through the Higher 
Education Act and other foundational statutes and policies. On the other, strategies of 
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renewal aim more broadly at constructing public policy that more fully democratizes 
higher education.  This includes reorientation towards common goals and the common 
good, and enhancing the autonomy of higher education institutions and the faculty and 
professionals who serve them. 
 
Legislating Privatization 
 The privatization of higher education has been neither absolute nor drastic, but 
rather accomplished by degrees over time and in relative terms.  Starting with the 1972 
Education amendments, Congress began to shift the financing of higher education from a 
focus on direct institutional support to a market-based approach that provided aid directly 
to students on the basis of need (Slaughter, 1998).  Through the Pell grant program, 
Congress sought to emphasize student choice in a marketplace of higher education 
alternatives, allowing students to decide the allocation of federal support to higher 
education institutions.  With the adoption of the Pell Grant Program, the Carnegie 
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching and other national policy institutions began 
to articulate a “high tuition-high aid” policy (Colwell, 1980; Leslie, 1995).  This was 
aimed at expanding Pell Grants, increasing the amount of funding allocated to them, and 
enabling students to select private institutions.  By the 1980s, Pell grants and other 
sources of student funding were stable while tuition rose, leaving students to foot the bill 
either through their own resources, their families, or through borrowing. 
 While direct grants to students fostered privatization, statutes were enacted which 
made the research universities more entrepreneurial, corporate and profit-oriented.  The 
Bayh-Dole Act (1980) gave universities and businesses the right to retain ownership of 
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inventions made with federal funds.  This made faculty-generated research a revenue 
source for individual institutions rather than a common source of knowledge made 
available to the scholarly community (Rhodes and Slaughter, 1991).  Legislation such as 
the Stevenson-Wydler Act (1980) enabled fuller cooperation between private businesses 
and universities in developing marketable products from intellectual property owned by 
universities through license or royalty agreements (Slaugher and Rhoades, 1996).  The 
National Cooperative Research Act (1984) changed antitrust law so as to enable 
cooperative funding of research and development by government, industry and 
universities.  The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (1988), among other statutes, 
sought to enhance intellectual property rights, including those held by universities and by 
consortia of universities, government and corporations.  In this way, university-based 
knowledge increasingly was constructed through property rights and in terms of profit-
making and revenue enhancement rather than as a common good.  Slaughter summarized 
this trend (1998): 
“In the 1980s and 1990s, universities participated in privatization, deregulation, 
and commercialization to a degree greater than any public institutions other than 
the federal laboratories.  Federal legislative changes overturned universities’ 
traditional position on intellectual property, in which intellectual property was the 
by-product of the quest for knowledge; instead it made knowledge, embodied in 
products and processes for global markets, the focus of science and technology.  
To a remarkable degree, the universities’ public interest mission was defined as 
best served by fostering the pursuit of private profit.” 
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Declining Government Support and Cost Shifting 
 The January 13, 2006, The Chronicle of Higher Education headline could not be 
much rosier:  “State Spending on Colleges Bounces Back” (A1).  The article goes on to 
document that state spending for higher education is growing at its fastest rate in five 
years, 5.3%, for a total of $66.6 billion.  This is the highest increase since the 7% increase 
in 2001. The largest increase for the coming year is in Hawaii, at 20.1%, followed by 
Alabama’s increase of 14.9%.  Twenty-seven states, including New York, New Jersey, 
Maryland, California, Virginia and Delaware, are increasing their higher education 
budgets by 5% or more, compared to fourteen states in 2005.  Four states, including 
Connecticut, Illinois, and Michigan, are decreasing their higher education spending for 
2006, compared to eight states in 2005. The Chronicle deems the actions of two 
Republican governors especially noteworthy. In California, Governor Schwarzenegger 
has proposed that the state allocate more than $129 million to prevent an 8% increase in 
undergraduate tuition and a 10% increase in undergraduate tuition.  In Maryland, 
Governor Ehrlich proposed a $172 million increase in state funding, much of it going to 
the University System of Maryland, which has reduced expenditures over the past two 
years. 
 This relatively good news must be put in the perspective of the epochal change 
toward privatization.  State Higher Education Finance FY 2005, a report published by the 
State Higher Executive Officers (SHEEO), provides context for the 2006 increases.  The 
data presented and analyzed in this report demonstrate a steady increase in net tuition as a 
percentage of total higher education revenues. In 1981, net tuition was 21.5% of total 
educational revenues.  This increased to 31% by 1995 and then declined slightly through 
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the remainder of the 1990s, falling just below 30% in 2001.  Since 2001, net tuition as a 
percentage of total higher education revenues has steadily increased to 36.7% in 2005.  
Over this twenty-four year period, net tuition has increased by more than 15% as a 
percentage of total higher education revenues. 
 In addition, the report shows that there are continuing pressures on higher 
education financial resources.  Between 2001 and 2005, enrollment at public institutions 
grew by 14.3% while inflation increased by 14.2%.  The increases in state funding over 
this period did not meet the increased enrollment and inflationary increases.  The report 
concludes that “the combined effects of enrollment growth and inflation grew faster than 
state and local support” (2006: 12).  In constant 2005 dollars, the state and local support 
per full-time student was $5,833, compared to $7,121 in 2001.  In effect, there was a 
funding decline of $1,288 per full-time student between 2001 and 2005.  In the face of 
“projected increases in the college age population” and “the increasing economic 
importance of higher education,” the report states that the demand for higher education 
and the fiscal pressures will continue (2006: 12).  Indeed, “if this trend continues both the 
American tradition of affordable higher education and student participation could be 
threatened” (2006:12). 
   The picture for federal funding of higher education also demonstrates a 
continuing trend toward privatization.  In Trends in Student Aid, 2004, College Board 
analysts state that the federal government provides 67% of direct aid to students (2005).  
In 2003-2004, the federal government provided $81 billion, constituting a 10% increase 
over 2002-2003 after accounting for inflation.  The composition of federal aid, however, 
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was largely in the form of student loans.  For 2003-2004, 70% of the aid was in the form 
of loans, about 21% was in grants, and 8% was in the form of tax benefits.   
The increase in loans over grants was characteristic of sourcing funding outside of 
direct federal support.  Between 1996 and 2001, grant aid was growing more rapidly than 
loans.  This was also true from 1990 to 1993.  From 2002 on, however, loans grew more 
than grants as a source of student financing for higher education.  Indeed, between 1993-
94 and 2003-04, the number of borrowers under Parent Loans for Undergraduates 
(PLUS) increased from 310,000 to 735,000.  The average loan parents assumed increased 
over this decade to $8,839, a rise of 54% in constant dollars (2005: 5).  
 By 2004, “combined, unsubsidized Stafford loans, federal loans to parents, and 
tax benefits” comprised 45% of total federal aid.  These loan and tax benefit programs, 
moreover, were benefits that went to middle- and higher-income families.  By 
comparison, Pell grants increased by 6% in 2003-2004.  In 2003-2004, Pell Grants 
“funded 5.1 million students with average grants of $2,466” (2005: 4).  As a result of an 
increase in the number of Pell Grant recipients over the previous year, the average grant 
actually fell by 1%.  This decline in inflation-adjusted value of Pell Grants was the first 
since 1999-2000.  In addition, while the average Pell Grant covered 35% of charges at 
four-year public institutions in 1980-81, this declined to 23% in 2003-2004. The funding 
for Pell Grants did not increase sufficiently to meet the growing demand. 
 The College Board Report for 2004-2005 documents further movement toward 
privatization in higher education funding.  In 2004-05, the fastest growing segment of 
student aid was private student loans (2006: 5).  While half of student aid came in the 
form of both subsidized and unsubsidized loans from the federal government, PLUS 
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loans grew fastest—by more than $1 billion.  Between 2003-04 and 2004-05, “the 
number of borrowers and the number of loans in PLUS programs grew more rapidly than 
the number in either Stafford loan program.  The unsubsidized Stafford Loan program 
grew more rapidly than the subsidized Stafford Loan Program” (2006: 5).  Perhaps most 
disturbing, the College Board Report suggests that “as many as 25% of college students 
may be relying on credit-card debt to help finance their education” (2006: 3).  By 2004-
05, the average debt for a student financing a bachelor’s degree at a public college or 
university was $15,500. 62% of students who received bachelor degrees at public 
institutions graduated with debt, compared to the 88% who graduated with a bachelor’s 
degree from a for-profit institution (2006: 12).  Moreover, the average Pell Grant 
declined by an additional 3% in 2004-05 in constant dollars. 
 This trend toward privatized financing has had dramatic effects on students, 
according to a report by the Higher Education Research Institute at UCLA summarized in 
The Chronicle of Higher Education (February 4, 2005: 1).  According to this report, more 
than 47% of college freshman said that they would likely have to work during the 
academic year; this included a majority of men (53%) and 39.6% of women. The report 
explained these expectations on the basis of tighter state budgets and declining Pell 
Grants.  Moreover, according to The Chronicle, “a number of studies have shown that 
working more than 20 hours a week increases the likelihood that a student will drop out 
of college” (February 4, 2005: A3).  The College Board report, Trends in College Pricing 
(2006), states that “40% of all undergraduates and almost two-thirds” at two-year 
institutions are attending part-time (2006: 2). 
8
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While privatization affects student and family finances at all income levels, 
lower-income students are most impacted (Reed and Szymanski, 2004).  According to a 
study by Eduardo J. Padron, President of Miami Dade College, “increasing college costs 
have a severe effect on low income students and families.  Compared to the 47% increase 
in costs (between 1994 and 2004), personal incomes have risen only 10%.  Published 
charges at public four-year colleges registered an astronomical 71% of a low income 
family’s earnings, compared to 5% and 19% for upper-middle and middle income 
families respectively. Up to 25% of academically qualified low-income students no 
longer even apply to college” (2005: 3).  As privatization becomes more dominant and 
the financing of higher education falls more on students and their families, class 
privileges are enforced. 
As indicated in the introduction, privatization impacts institutions of higher 
education beyond student funding.  Shifting greater financial responsibility to colleges 
and universities alters the character and mission of higher education.  As the sources of 
financial support change, so does the organizational culture and ethic of higher education 
institutions. 
 According to reports summarized in The Chronicle of Higher Education, private 
donations to colleges have been increasing over the past few years (March 11, 2005: 1).  
In 2001, private contributions totaled $24.2 billion.  This declined to $23.9 billion each in 
2002 and 2003.  In 2004, private contributions grew to $24.4 billion, a 3.2% increase.  
Much of this funding, about 28%, came from alumni.  Another 25% was donated by 
foundations.  The overall 3.2% increase was about the same as the level of inflation.  In 
addition, non-alumni individuals gave about 21% of the total contributions in 2004, 
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compared with the 18% they gave in 2003.  Corporate giving was 3.5% in 2004 
compared to 2.8% in 2003.  One problematic change was 12.8% of alumni contributed, a 
number that declined for the third year.  While alumni contributions are increasing, the 
number of individual alumni contributing has been declining. John Lippincott, president 
of the Council for advancement and Support of Education, voiced another concern.  
Lippincott stated, “I’m concerned that when we applaud the results, there is a tendency 
on the part of some that it means that the state or federal government can reduce their 
support” (March 11, 2005: A3).  In other words, success in raising private funds may lead 
to a decline in public funding. 
 In addition to the increase in private donations, college endowments have had 
“respectable” returns according to a report by The Chronicle of Higher Education 
(January 27, 2006: A1).  While on average, endowments had losses in 2001 and 2002, 
there was a gain of 3% in 2003. The average return on college endowments was about 
15% in 2004 and about 9% in 2005.  There was considerable variation in rates of return 
in 2005, with the lowest at an 11% loss and the highest at a 22.3% gain (January 27, 
2006: A30). Yale University, with the second largest endowment in the country, 
apparently posted the highest gain.   
As a general rule, large endowments tend to have higher returns than small 
endowments; this is due, in part, to wider resource allocation, greater risk taking, and use 
of the best management.  Scott Malpass, vice president and chief investment officer at the 
University of Notre Dame, said of the 17.9% gain in Notre Dame’s $3.65 endowment, 
“Private equity, real estate, our private-energy portfolio investments in merging markets, 
venture capital, commodities – these are all things that did well for us” (January 27, 
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2006: A30).  Only 9.6% of endowment assets are managed internally; for the fifth year in 
a row, institutions are looking to outside professionals to manage their endowments. As 
senior managing director of TIAA-CREF Asset Management Nancy Heller stated, “There 
has been a general trend toward outsourcing.  Asset classes are more complex, and some 
institutions can only afford to have one person internally.” 
 Reporting on a survey conducted by the Association of University Technology 
Managers, The Chronicle of Higher Education states that “colleges and universities in the 
2003 fiscal year filed more patents, identified a greater number of scientific discoveries, 
with commercial potential than ever, and signed a record number of licenses with 
companies seeking to turn academic inventions into drugs, devices, and other products” 
(December 3, 2004: A27).  In 2003, 165 institutions received almost $1 billion in 
licensing revenues.  These included rights to use university-owned inventions, 
settlements from patent infringement lawsuits, and “cashed-out equity in spinoff 
companies” (December 3, 2004: A27).  About 25% of the licensing fees and spinoffs are 
concentrated in seven research universities.  New York University, earning $86 million, 
ranked first with a 37% increase over 2002.  The largest source of this income was from a 
drug, Romicade, which treats rheumatoid arthritis and Crohn’s disease. There are about 
20 drugs on the market which use NYU-owned technology.  According to Michael 
Douglas, associate vice-chancellor and director of the Office of Technology Management 
at Washington University in St. Louis, being successful in this arena “all depends on 
bringing in a big deal” (December 3, 2004: A27).  His university almost doubled its 
royalty earnings, from $6.5 million to $12.5 million, by getting a big upfront payment 
from a German pharmaceutical company.  
11
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Analyzing Sources of Privatization: Fiscal Crisis 
 In Ensuring the Nation’s Future: Preserving the Promise of Higher Education in 
an Era of Fiscal Challenges (2005), a Task Force of the AAUP’s Committee on 
Government Relations addressed challenges to higher education financing.  They focused 
on the role of the state in funding.  The causes of this crisis include unfunded mandates 
imposed on states by the federal government; sales taxes lost when customers shop from 
tax-free catalogues and Web sites; and revenues lost because federal statutes make the 
Internet tax-free.  In addition, federal tax cuts enacted in 2001 impacted revenues for the 
many states which base their tax structure on the federal tax code.  Citing a study by the 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, the AAUP report claims that states lost $9 billion 
over the fiscal years 2002-05, due to changes in the federal tax code.  Furthermore, states 
face many pressures for spending on Medicaid, prisons, K-12 education, and post-9/11 
security.  These structural changes have long-term consequences for higher education 
funding, fueling the politics of privatization.  
 Such recent changes have occurred in a broader historical context of 
transformation.  Just as the change toward greater privatization in higher education 
financing emerged in the early 1970s (Slaughter, 1998), so did James O’Connor’s 
seminal work on the fiscal crisis of the state (1973).  By analyzing the political and 
economic forces leading to fiscal crises, O’Connor provides a framework for the 
conceptualization underlying this shift in policy.    
There are both structural and ideological dimensions to the fiscal crisis.  
Structurally, the fiscal crisis of the state results from contradictions among the three 
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major sectors of the political economy: (1) the monopoly sector comprising capital and 
union-intensive manufacturing including automobiles, aerospace and steel; (2) the state 
sector comprising federal research and development, governmental agencies dealing with 
health and welfare, and education; and (3) a competitive sector comprised of low capital 
and technology service, agricultural and light manufacturing, combined with low levels 
of unionization.  In O’Connor’s analysis, the needs of the corporate monopoly sector for 
research and development, capital investment in infrastructure, and a healthy and 
educated work force depend upon the activities of the state sector. Displaced and retiring 
workers in the monopoly sector also depend on the state sector for a measure of 
economic security. The competitive sector has members of the workforce who depend 
upon government to compensate them through unemployment insurance, welfare and 
other programs for the weaknesses and dislocations of the seasonal and competitive tasks 
they fulfill.   
These three sectors become contradictory with the stresses on and decline of state 
tax revenues provided primarily by workers in the monopoly corporate sector.  In 
O’Connor’s view, the revenue crisis is caused largely by growing productivity in the 
monopoly sector and a declining demand for labor.  To the degree that state-sector 
workers are compensated in line with monopoly-sector workers—and that as monopoly-
sector workers move to the competitive sector, their direct need for government support 
increases—the demand for government services tends to grow.  These demands, 
moreover, grow in the face of a relative decline in revenues.  As a result, there is a 
powerful structural gap between revenues and expenditures which takes the form of a 
fiscal crisis of the state. 
13
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 This fiscal crisis proceeded with even greater ferocity than O’Connor anticipated 
during the mid- to late-1970s and 1980s.  The gap between the revenue base for 
government and the demands for government expenditures exploded during that period as 
a result of the petroleum crisis; rapid inflation due to both federal deficits and major 
increases in the prices of basic commodities; and, perhaps most importantly, the collapse 
and “deindustrialization” of the monopoly sector of the economy due to foreign 
competition in domestic and international markets,. 
 There were, in O’Connor’s view, several different directions for managing, if not 
resolving, the fiscal crisis.  One policy direction was toward greater income equality 
among the different sectors of the economy.  Greater equality would mitigate the 
economic distress of the competitive sector, thereby reducing expenditures.  Associated 
with this approach was a policy of greater rationality in government programs and 
functions; this involves the streamlining of governmental agencies, combination of 
federal and state activities, utilization of better management techniques, and other efforts 
to make the government more efficient without diminishing its effectiveness.  Another, 
more fateful approach, looked toward reducing expectations for government services, 
reducing governmental responsibilities in the areas of welfare provision, and reducing 
taxes.  This final approach dominated the Reagan Administration’s formulation of 
“supply side economics.”  This approach to fiscal policy is predicated on the idea that 
lower marginal tax rates and taxes on capital would spur economic activity and, 
ultimately, tax revenues.  Combined with a right-wing social ideology of heightened 
individual responsibility and decreased community responsibility, traditional family and 
14
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religious values, and limited government, the fiscal and ideological context for the 
politics of privatization in higher education financing was well established. 
 In their analysis of today’s heightened fiscal crisis, Rubin, Orszag and Sinai 
provide a centrist analysis that stresses the contradictory features of privatization politics 
(2004).  Their approach highlights the seriousness of the current crisis, lays considerable 
responsibility on the policies of the Bush Administration, and calls for both spending 
restraints and a rollback of tax cuts.   
Both ideologically and politically, the current Bush Administration has bolstered 
privatization. A fiscal policy focusing on tax cuts favoring wealth and high-income 
households has been in place since 2001 (Rubin, Orszag and Sinai: 2004).  The right-
wing political agenda aims to use revenue limits to undermine the federal government’s 
capacity to provide services, thereby “starving the beast.”  This, however, has been 
contradicted by actual political forces.  “Despite assertions to the contrary, granting large 
tax cuts to some groups may thus make it less politically feasible to rein in the desires of 
other constituencies to obtain increases in spending programs” (Rubin, et.al, 2004: 15).  
The right-wing view that “engineering a fiscal crisis” would serve as a means to control 
and sharply curtail spending on entitlement and discretionary programs is fairly 
implausible.  Such a “self-imposed” crisis is more likely to lead to a political impasse in 
which deficits grow. 
Rubin, et.al., argue that “balancing the budget for the longer term will require a 
combination of expenditure restraint and revenue increases” (2004: 16).  While opposing 
driving down revenues to curtail government responsibilities and spending, they do not 
move beyond the current political framework.  In effect, the politics of privatization 
15
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would continue to serve as the main political reality, albeit with somewhat less austere 
outcomes, due to a rollback of the most severe tax cuts enacted since 2001. 
 
Key Policy Directions in Higher Education 
 Fiscal crises and the politics of privatization ground much of the contemporary 
policy debate around higher education funding and ideologies. There are three broadly 
defined ways to approach these fiscal problems, from a view towards: (1) cutting 
government support, in the belief that this would actually be beneficial; (2) balancing 
public and private spending; (3) maximizing government support by providing for free 
higher education. 
 The CATO Institute posits that cutting governmental higher education spending 
would actually be beneficial.  Gary Wolfram, a George Munson Professor of Political 
Science, argues in Policy Analysis that “Congress should consider a phase-out of higher 
education over a 12-year period” (2005: 1).  Wolfram maintains that such a phase-out 
would have a number of salutary effects.  First, the withdrawal of federal funding would 
strengthen the independence of higher education institutions.  Their autonomy would 
increase with less deference to federal monies and federal regulations.  Second, Wolfram 
suggests that a decline in federal funding would lead to a reduction in tuition prices.  
Since the federal government is a third-party payer for higher education, its expenditures 
serve to increase demand for college attendance and, thereby, spur increases in tuition.  
Third, the “private market” would respond to a federal government phase-out by 
increasing private sector loans, providing additional private scholarships, and expanding 
“human capital contracts,” which “would allow students to pledge a portion of future 
16
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 3
http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss1/3
 17 
earnings in return for assistance in paying their tuition.”  In effect, cutting government 
subsidies to higher education would reduce taxes and expenditures, reduce the costs of 
higher education, and enhance private action and responsibilities. 
 Another approach, touted by the International Monetary Fund, emphasizes the 
importance of establishing a new balance between public and private spending.  In a 
report prepared by Nicholas Barr based on generalizations from experiences in the United 
Kingdom, two key “economic” principles underlie this new balance: (1) central planning 
is no longer feasible or desirable; and (2) students should contribute to the cost of their 
degree.  Barr argues that since both society and the individual benefit from higher 
education, both public and private benefits should be recognized and duly rewarded.  The 
public benefits merit public financing, especially for those students who cannot afford to 
pay.  The private benefits accrue to the individual and should therefore be paid by that 
individual.  In order to fulfill the public role, access to higher education could be realized 
through scholarships and grants to “students from poor backgrounds” (2005: 6).  In 
addition, there should be support for students with low earnings after graduation. Beyond 
need-based scholarships and grants, students should finance their education through a 
mixture of public and private sector loans aiming at an interest rate “broadly equal to the 
government’s cost of borrowing” (2005: 3).  This approach seeks to balance the social 
and individual benefits of higher education financially, through the provision of 
government funds enabling access and subsidies to control interest rates.  This centrist 
position accords with the Rubin, et.al., position on fiscal crisis policies. 
 The third position, articulated by Reed and Szymanski in Academe (2004), calls 
for free public higher education.  This approach takes into account how the politics of 
17
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privatization exacerbate the crisis of access and affordability; more significantly, it 
assumes that public higher education is a right for “all applicants who meet admissions 
standards regardless of their ability to pay” (2004: 39-40).  Claiming that such a program 
would cost an additional $60 billion beyond current government expenditures, the authors 
argue that it could be easily paid for, by “closing some corporate tax loopholes, 
eliminating some tax cuts for the very wealthy, or taking a slice from the $400 billion 
defense budget” (2004: 43).  The proposal, modeled on the GI Bill of Rights, is self-
consciously rooted in a populist politics of opportunity, greater equality, and collective 
identity.  While farther away from the current ideological mainstream than either of the 
other two approaches, it makes access to higher education a political goal that is within 
reach and which “can be won in the foreseeable future” (2004: 43). 
 
A Politics of Resistance 
 In a fiscal and political climate dominated by a politics of privatization, much of 
the higher education community has been engaged in preventing further erosion of 
funding and demanding restoration of prior levels of funding.  While the Collective 
Bargaining Congress of the AAUP, several AFL-CIO state organizations, and other union 
and educational groups have endorsed the proposal for free public higher education, their 
practical efforts have been bounded by current legislative initiatives and debates.  
Therefore, the AAUP has mainly looked towards “full funding for student aid, 
institutional aid, academic research, professional development and other programs that 
strengthen the quality of higher education and promote broad access to our nation’s 
colleges and universities” (AAUP Position Paper, 2005).  Current policy focuses on 
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exerting influence on the House and Senate subcommittees that provide funding for 
existing programs. For example, in regard to student aid the AAUP calls for an increase 
in the Pell Grant to $4,500, to “ensure that all students receive the maximum grant they 
are entitled to.”  The AAUP has called for increased research funding for the sciences 
through NIH, NSF and EPA programs, as well as “level” funding for the humanities 
through the National Endowment for Humanities. To help build coalitions around student 
funding and research funding, the AAUP has memberships in the Student Aid Alliance 
and the National Humanities Alliance. 
 Other efforts have apparently split some higher education advocates (Inside 
Higher Education, March 27, 2006). The National Association of Independent Colleges 
and Universities strongly opposes legislation approved by the House Education and 
Workforce Committee favoring for-profit institutions. They have sought to defend 
funding sources for traditional institutions by limiting the eligibility of for-profit 
institutions for student financial aid.  The association also opposes weakening eligibility 
standards, which would require colleges to generate at least 10% of their revenues from 
sources other than federal financial aid programs. In the same vein, they oppose the 
creation of a “single definition” of a higher education institution that would enable for-
profit institutions to become eligible for a variety of federal grants.   Other groups, such 
as the American Council on Education, have not been as sharp in their criticism. They 
have sought to work with the Congressional leadership in an effort to soften their 
positions and work out a compromise for reauthorizing the Higher Education Act. 
 Despite defensive positions of strong opposition and “working with the 
leadership,” abstract, systems-based rhetoric obfuscates the formulation of directions for 
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higher education, as demonstrated by the tone of a report by The Commission on Public 
University Renewal (2005).  This commission, established by the American Association 
of State Colleges and Universities, extols public higher education “as one of the true 
success stories in our nation’s history,” that has served “students, main streets, 
communities, and states from the Industrial Age to the Space Age and now to the 
Information Age” (2005: 1).  Despite such glorifying language, every quote that follows 
here exemplifies the vague, catchphrase-laden style that utterly fails to impart any 
significant meaning. 
The report recognizes the pressures on state treasuries, and places special 
emphasis on Medicaid and an aging population. “The share of the states’ general fund 
budgets dedicated to Medicaid has doubled over the past two decades, and now exceeds 
that of higher education.  The share of the population 65 and older – which tends to rely 
more on public services – is projected to jump from 12 percent in 2000 to 20 percent in 
2030” (2005: 5).  In the face of these pressures, the report calls for “a long term vision,” 
and for “campuses and systems” to work “collaboratively to renew and update basic 
commitments, specifically, broad access to quality opportunity and partnerships for the 
public good” (2005: 6).  Public higher education and government must “be prepared to 
give a little” to realize these commitments (2005: 28).  While government should give up 
efforts to “micromanage,” “colleges and universities have to focus more on 
demonstrating outcomes and return on investment” (2005: 28).  In demonstrating 
outcomes, there should be a focus “on products rather than the means of production” and 
“greater public entrepreneurship” that enhances “flexibility, agility, creativity and 
calculated risk taking” (2005: 28).  In making these directions operational, the report calls 
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on presidents and chancellors to “create incentives for entrepreneurial behavior and 
efficiency.” Similarly, policy makers and administrators need to “more comprehensively 
account for student progress” through “accountability systems” that enable better 
measurement of “institutional outcomes” (2005: 31). 
 
Directions for Renewal 
 The examples of resistance given above are sobering.  They reflect that, indeed, 
the “higher education policy arena of the last century has fragmented into multiple 
arenas” reflecting a wide range of interests and constituencies (Parsons, 2005: B20).  The 
policy arena of the past, featuring a bipartisan approach to higher education, no longer 
exists.  With a “general shift toward viewing college as a private benefit instead of a 
common good,” traditional advocates for higher education are newly in the minority. 
According to Parsons, they must seek to build coalitions around specific issues and view 
themselves as “just another special interest” (2005: B20). 
 Advocates for higher education must attend to the details of specific legislation 
and administrative rules, keep communications open with members of Congress and their 
staffs, and make every effort to inform the wider public of inequities in higher education 
funding and the particular burdens placed on students and families, especially those with 
low incomes.  The AAUP Task Force on State Budget supports these approaches (2005).  
The Task Force has urged states to “update their revenue systems to reflect structural 
changes in the economy,” and to “encourage faculty to work within institutional 
governance structures to ensure that colleges and universities deliver quality programs at 
top efficiency” (2005).  We must be continually engaged in current political realities. In 
21
Turkel: Financing Higher Education: Privatization, Resistance and Renewal
Published by The Keep, 2006
 22 
the everyday efforts of higher education policy formation, we should address issues at the 
limits of what is practical. 
 Yet, especially for faculty activists in the union movement, the present constraints 
must be confronted through greater efforts at organization, education, and imagination.  
As unionists, we do not report to the chancellor, the provost, or the board of trustees, but 
rather to our colleagues. We take to heart the interests of other stakeholders in higher 
education: employees, students and their families.  If the politics of privatization defines 
this epoch, we must begin to build a new epoch from within it.  Such an epoch would, to 
be sure, place high value on scientific knowledge and expertise.  But it would do so in a 
way that viewed such knowledge as the common moral property of humanity.  Such an 
epoch would value creativity, diversity and equality in the access to higher education not 
only as a career path for individuals, but as a way of building community, collective 
identities, and shared culture.  Such an epoch would enable higher education faculty and 
professionals to address such key issues as national health care, ecological renewal, and 
economic justice in ways that directly relate to the interests and values of broad citizenry. 
As part of the broader social fabric, faculty and professionals in higher education 
institutions are uniquely positioned to articulate and help build a better future. 
 Building popular coalitions within the labor movement around shared values —
among alumni, students and broader communities—is crucial if we are to break the 
current fetters on higher education. Such coalitions must be built by attending to the 
deeper sources of the fiscal crisis of higher education. Challenging the politics of 
privatization and providing a workable alternative requires bringing together expertise in 
a variety of areas that directly impact higher education costs. Such an agenda would 
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resolve broader problems in the political economy, renew sources of funding for the 
public good, and provide directions for social renewal. 
 Medical care is the most pressing issue in such an agenda.  As pointed out 
recently by Paul Krugman and Robin Wells, the provision of medical care in the U.S. 
pours huge amounts of money into disorganized, privatized institutions and corporations 
(March 23, 2006: 38-42).   We should aim at building a single-payer, universal, and 
equitable health-insurance system. A second core issue is investment in energy research 
and development that has the potential to reduce costs, reduce environmental threats, and 
generate employment.  Research universities in conjunction with local communities 
should be the crucibles for this research.  A more equitable wage structure and 
employment security built on the foundation of a living wage would alleviate many of the 
stresses faced by state and federal budgets.  A more humane and rational approach to the 
criminal justice system, including an end to the “war against drugs” that fills jails and 
prisons at enormous human and financial costs, must become a priority.  A tax policy that 
restores the estate tax, fairly taxes financial transfers, and imposes sales taxes on internet 
sales would bring in revenues to better support public policies and commitments, 
including higher education. 
 Higher education advocates, and unionists in particular, must focus on immediate 
financial issues in legislative and regulatory arenas. Yet there must also be space and 
resources devoted to broadening coalitions and providing a vision of the structure and 
mission of higher education in a more democratic and humane epoch.  As educators, 
professionals and scholars committed to the common good, this is our obligation and the 
source of our public purpose.  
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